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ABSTRACT
This thesis quantitatively analyzes the factors that affect weapon
system cost growth after Milestone II. The data from nine weapon systems
was reconstructed by the Army and Navy from Selected Acquisition Reports
(SARs) with the cost variances reclassified into a new categorization
system to more readily determine the causes of cost growth. Each cost
variance was classified as to whether it was attributable to a mistake in
the cost estimating process or a post-Milestone II decision, with further
classification into subcategories for a more detailed analysis. The cost
variances were divided by the Milestone II Decision Estimate (DE) to form
a cost growth ratio (CGR) . The findings reveal that the Department of
Defense has about 10.8% cost growth in the procurement process. Cost
growth due to decisions outweigh mistakes by a factor of 2.3:1. A
majority of the mistake cost growth is due to errors in the estimation of
production costs. A majority of the decision cost growth is due to
schedule slippage. Low cost systems have 2.4 times as much mistake cost
growth as high cost systems. Newer missile systems have significantly
less mistake cost growth when compared to other systems. Lastly, the Army
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A common perception among the public, in Congress, and even within the
defense establishment is that weapon system cost growth results from poor
managerial practices combined with an inability to accurately estimate
weapons system costs. This oversimplification of a very complex problem
is at the forefront of discussion now that reduced budgets, military
downsizing, and decreased procurement are realities.
Many cost growth studies occurred in the early 1980s in response to
the military buildup which began in 1980. Very little research has been
done since then on the new high technology systems. This lack of adequate
research combined with tighter military budgets shows a need for new
research on the factors affecting cost growth. The objective of this
research is not to predict or model particular systems, but to determine
those factors that affect the cost growth of the Department of Defense
(DoD) as a whole.
In order to more readily identify areas of cost growth, it is
necessary to classify the cost variances into a more useable and more
detailed categorization system. The new categorization system
differentiates between decisions made that would knowingly increase weapon
system cost and mistakes that misestimated aspects in the process which,
if estimated correctly, would not have resulted in cost growth. The new
categories also partition these two broad categories into six
subcategories each to give insight into the most likely areas for cost
growth to occur.
The data was analyzed to determine if factors such as system cost,
service, and type of system affect cost growth. This was done to identify
specific areas in the cost estimation and procurement processes that need
attention and to determine the probable causes of these differences.
The findings reveal that the Department of Defense has experienced
approximately 10.8% cost growth in the procurement process after Milestone
II, which is lower than might be expected. Studies done during the early
1980s report that the average total cost growth of weapon systems was
between 20% and 30%. However, the time of those studies is relevant to
the difference in findings. Three major changes have occurred in the last
decade to lower weapon system cost growth. First, estimators have
developed a large computerized cost data base to more accurately predict
costs. Second, high technology systems, that were brand new in 1980, have
been developed and produced so that they are now much easier to estimate.
Lastly, the early studies resulted in a determined effort by the
Department of Defense to control cost growth.
Mistakes made in the estimation of system costs make up 30.6% of the
total cost growth of a system while decisions make up 69.4% of the total
cost growth. Therefore decisions outweigh mistakes by a margin of 2.3:1.
A majority of the mistake cost growth is attributable to mistakes in
estimating the cost of production. However, mistake cost growth averages
only 3.3% and is not nearly as significant as controlling the cost growth
due to decisions.
A majority of the decision cost growth is attributable to schedule
slippage. Some of this schedule slippage can be attributed to decisions
to change the design and performance requirements of the system, while the
remaining amount is unexplained. Further study concentrating on the
causes of schedule slippage needs to be done.
The low cost systems have a higher mistake cost growth when compared
to high cost systems by a margin of 2.4:1. Two possible explanations
exist for this effect. First, estimators do not take as much care in
estimating the costs of low cost systems since they are not as visible on
an oversight level. The second reason concerns the nature of high cost
and low cost systems. A majority of high cost systems are large platforms
which have a majority of their production cost resulting from large
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components or similar components that have been used before. This makes
the estimation of the production costs of these large components fairly-
accurate. Therefore, the mistakes in estimating the smaller and
relatively cheaper items would be masked in high cost systems by these
high cost items. Therefore, the difference between the low cost and high
cost system mistake cost growth is probably not as significant as it
appears to be
.
The significant difference between the cost growth of new missile
systems and other weapon systems is that the mistake cost growth for new
missile systems is significantly less than that of other systems,
specifically in estimating the cost of production. This is due to the
evolutionary nature of missile systems. The guidance, propulsion, and
warhead systems of newer missiles is generally a modernization or
modification of a previous system. This would tend to increase the
accuracy of missile system estimates over other weapon systems. Previous
studies show that missile systems have a much higher cost growth than do
other systems. These studies included much older missile systems. The
evolutionary process discussed above had not yet developed and therefore
a higher cost growth could have resulted.
The Army and Navy have effectively equal cost growths. A majority of
early 1980s studies reported that the Army had a significantly higher cost
growth than the Navy. This was attributed to the modernization of the
Army. This study concentrated on more recent weapons systems and did not
find this to be the case. The most obvious explanation for this effect is
that the Army has completed its modernization and is now proficient at
controlling the costs of its weapon systems.
These results are promising in that it appears that over the last
decade, the DoD has gained control over cost growth. It is still
necessary to determine and correct the cause of schedule slippage, but, on
the whole, the cost growth problem is being solved.
xn
I . INTRODUCTION
A common perception among the public, in Congress, and even within
the defense establishment is that weapons system cost growth results
from poor managerial practices combined with an inability to accurately
estimate weapons system costs. This oversimplification of a very
complex problem is at the forefront of discussion now that reduced
budgets, military downsizing, and decreased procurement are realities.
Many studies have shown that most of a weapons system' s procurement
cost growth occurs after it enters Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) but prior to Full Scale Production [Ref . 1] . This
cost growth will be magnified if the United States attempts to maintain
its technological edge in the reduced budget environment by developing
technology and then "shelving it" until needed. This will result in
increased scrutiny by the Congress on cost growth and its control
.
Most of the research on cost growth occurred prior to the 1980'
s
military buildup. Some research focused on single system cost growth
(e.g., just the F-14 [Ref. 2]). This was done to identify and change
managerial and estimating problems within a particular weapons system
already identified as having high cost growth. The remaining research
used the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) categories for a basis [Ref
3] . In the SAR, each cost variance is categorized as an estimating,
economic, quantity, schedule, support or other change from the Milestone
II baseline estimate. Unfortunately, these categories were not
uniformly used across different systems to classify cost variances,
making any cross-system analysis using these categories of limited
validity. Furthermore, the criteria for classifying a cost variance
into one of these SAR categories changed in the mid-1980' s and as a
result, comparisons across this time are not valid. Therefore, none of
the relatively new high technology systems can be analyzed using a time
series approach.
As a result of this lack of adequate data on current technology
combined with tighter military budgets, new research on the factors
affecting cost growth is required. It will be necessary to form new
categorization criteria for cost variances in order to break the cost
variances into a more useful structure. The objective of this research
is not to predict or model particular systems, but to determine those
factors that affect the cost growth of the Department of Defense as a
whole. The quantitative analysis of this data is designed to yield
descriptive information on those areas in the procurement process where
cost growth is occurring. This information can be used by Program
Managers and cost estimators to evaluate their cost methodology and
refine their cost estimating techniques. This should ultimately yield
lower procurement cost growth.
II. BACKGROUND
A. REVIEW OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief review of the
weapons system acquisition process prior to a discussion of research
methodology used and why data from specific points in the acquisition
process was used.
The acquisition process is broken down into five phases with the
transition between phases being marked by a milestone. Decision
authorities determine at each milestone whether the results of the
previous phase warrant continuation into the next acquisition phase.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 (current version dated February
1991) describes the process and discusses the objectives of each phase
and milestone in the acquisition process. Systems within the
acquisition process do not necessarily follow this exact process.
However, each system must ultimately gain approval at each milestone in
this process.
1. Mission Need
Initially, a determination of mission need is decided upon, by
various sources, based upon continuing assessments of the military
requirements and capabilities.
2. Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval
Decision authorities determine if a study of alternatives is
warranted and determine the alternatives to be evaluated. If approval
is granted, the system proceeds into Phase 0.
3. Phase 0, Concept Exploration and Definition
Various alternatives are evaluated. The most promising systems
satisfying the mission requirements are evaluated to determine high risk
areas and initial objectives for program cost, schedule, and
performance
.
4. Milestone I, Concept Demonstration Approval
Decision authorities determine if a new acquisition program is
needed based on the results of Phase 0. A baseline for program cost,
schedule, and performance is established. Approval at Milestone I
authorizes the program to move into Phase I.
5. Phase I, Demonstration and Validation
Critical design and performance characteristics are thoroughly-
evaluated. Schedule, cost, and performance objectives are refined.
6. Milestone II, Development Approval
If the results of Phase I warrant continuation, a Developmental
Baseline for cost, schedule and performance for the program is approved.
This includes the Developmental Estimate (DE) which defines the
objective total system cost. This estimate is the refined total cost
from Milestone I. Milestone II approval authorizes program continuation
into Phase II.
7. Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
The system enters full scale engineering development. A cost
effective, producible design is developed to validate the production
process. Tests are conducted to verify that system performance
satisfies performance requirements.
8. Milestone III, Production Approval
A production baseline for cost, schedule and performance using
the revised data from Phase II is established. The system now proceeds
into Phase III.
9. Phase III, Production and Deployment/Phase IV, Operations and
Support
An efficient production capability along with its associated
support base is established to achieve operational capability satisfying
the mission need. Once initial systems are fielded, system monitoring,
support and problem correction continue throughout system lifetime.
10. Milestone IV, Major Modification Approval
Decision authorities determine if a major modification or
change to the system is warranted and if so, how to implement this
change in the most effective manner.
B. SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT (SAR)
The data used is derived from the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
.
Comprehensive instructions for the SAR are contained in Department of
Defense Manual 5000. 2M. The SAR is a comprehensive report designed to
provide Defense Department officials with cost and management
information on each major weapons system. The SARs are submitted to the
Congress to allow the Armed Services Committees to monitor the
Department's progress in meeting its procurement plans, and to provide
an early warning of emerging cost problems
.
The SARs are compilations of status reports from the Program
Managers responsible for major defense acquisition programs. They
provide each Program Manager's latest estimates of progress in achieving
key goals with respect to performance, schedule and cost. The most
recent estimates are recorded in then year dollars and in constant base
year dollars, with the base year generally being the Milestone II year.
SARs are required by Department of Defense Manual 5000. 2M to be
submitted for programs that have been designated by the Secretary of
Defense as major systems or are estimated to cost more than $200 million
for research, development, test, and evaluation or more than $1 billion
for procurement. Highly classified programs are excluded from this
requirement. SARs are prepared on an exception basis for the first,
second, and third quarter of each year, with a comprehensive report for
the fourth quarter ending December 31. The cost data in the December
SARs are expected to correspond to data in the President's annual budget
submitted to the Congress in January.
1. SAR Categories
The SAR reports the Program Manager's most recent best cost
estimate. The initial estimate listed in the SAR is the baseline
estimate or developmental estimate (DE) . The DE is generally made at
Milestone II in the acquisition process. The SAR records all changes in
terms of deviation from the previous cost estimate. These changes are
defined as cost variances. The sum of all the cost variances and the DE
is defined as the Current Estimate (CE)
.
Each cost variance listed in the SAR is categorized according to
the cause of change. These categories are explicitly defined in
Department of Defense Manual 5000. 2M.
a. Quantity Change
A cost variance is classified as a quantity change if it is
due to a change in the number of units of an end item of equipment
.
b. Schedule Change
A cost variance is classified as a schedule change if it is
due to a change in procurement or delivery schedule, completion date, or
intermediate milestone for development or production.
c. Engineering Change
A cost variance is classified as an engineering change if it
is due to an alteration in the physical or function characteristics of a
system or item delivered, to be delivered, or under development, after
establishment of such characteristics.
d. Economic Change
A cost variance is classified as an economic change if it is
due to price level changes in the economy.
e. Estimating Change
A cost variance is classified as an estimating change if it
is for correction of an error, refinement of a prior Current Estimate,
or a change in program or cost estimating assumptions and techniques.
f. Support Change
A cost variance is classified as a support change if it is
due to a change in cost, regardless of reason, associated with any work
breakdown structure element not included in the flyaway, rollaway, or
sailaway cost.
g. Other Change
A cost variance is classified in the other change category
if it cannot be classified into one of the above categories.
III. ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE DATA
A. PROCUREMENT COSTS
Weapon system costs are broken down into two major cost categories,
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs and
procurement costs. This study will focus on only the procurement cost
growth of major weapons systems. RDT&E cost growth is difficult to
quantify because of constantly changing requirements and modifications
in the initial design of the system. These changes, which occur prior
to Milestone II, could greatly affect the RDT&E cost growth.
Also, the major focus of this research is to identify managerial and
cost estimation problems within the Department of Defense after a system
enters EMD. Analysis of RDT&E cost growth would be more beneficial in
defining areas that need attention within the initial stages of concept
exploration and definition.
B. NEW CATEGORICAL DEFINITIONS
The criteria for classifying cost variances into the SAR categories
has changed over the years. This makes any cross system analysis of
limited validity. Also, the SAR categories do not allow for easy
identification of the root causes behind cost growth of a particular
weapon system [Ref . 4] . For example, a cost variance in the support
category does not show whether the cost variance was due to a decision
to change the support requirements or if a mistake was made in initial
estimate of the support costs. Therefore, the cost variances need to be
reclassified into a new categorization format before any analysis of the
reasons for cost growth can be done.
The new categorization system used is under development by the
Department of Defense (DoD) . The new categories used to classify cost
variances must differentiate between decisions that are made that would
knowingly increase weapon system cost (i.e., increased range or
performance) and mistakes that underestimated or overestimated aspects
in the process which, if estimated correctly, would not have resulted
in cost growth. The new categories must also partition these broad
categories into smaller subcategories to give insight into the most
likely areas for cost growth to occur.
The new categories consist of two major categories defined as to
whether the cost variance was due to a decision or a mistake. The cost
variance is further classified into one of six subcategories according
to the specific area that is related.
1. Decision Variance
A decision variance is a cost variance due to a decision
external to a program's defined Milestone II baseline. Examples include
changes in system capability and acquisition strategy changes (such as
dual source procurement, multiyear procurement, etc.) not dictated by
fact of life conditions. Decision variances are subcategorized by the
type of change . These subcategories are
:
a. Dcrv
A cost variance is classified in the Dcrv category if it
results from a decision that changes the system requirements or results
in a new variant of the system.
b . Dsmmi
A cost variance is classified in the Dsmmi category if it
results from a decision that causes changes to the procurement schedule,




A cost variance is classified in the Dils category if it
results from a decision to change the Integrated Logistical Support
(ILS) factors or changes in spares or support requirements.
d.
Depf
A cost variance is classified in the Depf category if it
results from changes to the external program factors (foreign military
sales (FMS) , labor strikes, etc)
.
e. Descl
A cost variance is classified in the Descl category if it




This category is designed to account for minor or unforeseen




A mistake variance is a cost variance not attributable to post-
Milestone II decisions. Examples include method errors, omissions,
schedule slips attributable to technical problems, weight growth, and
inadequately scoped engineering and software development efforts. An
important point is that this category is considerably broader than
estimating error: "mistakes" include many factors that are manifestly
not considered to be related to "cost estimating" (e.g., weight growth).
This category is intended to capture all the variance that the
acquisition system as a whole should have anticipated, not just the cost




A cost variance is classified in the Mcep category if it is
due to a mistake in estimating the production costs of the system.
b. Mcede
A cost variance is classified in the Mcede category if it is




A cost variance is classified in the Mils category if it is




A cost variance is classified in the Mssmf category if it is
due to schedule slips and or changes in the management factors that are
not attributable to a decision.
e. Mescl
A cost variance is classified in the Mescl category if it is
caused by a mistake in estimating the escalation requirements.
f. Mother
This category is designed to account for minor or unforeseen
mistake variances that cannot be categorized into one of the above
categories
.
This new classification system will allow for a more detailed
evaluation of the factors affecting cost growth. It will indicate the
specific areas in which cost growth is occurring and where measures to
control cost growth should be focused.
C. USING SAR DATA
Each service was tasked by the DoD to reconstruct the data into the
new categories using historical SAR data.
1. Advantages of SAR Data
A majority of major weapons systems are required to have a
SAR filed on them. This allows for a comprehensive analysis of cost
growth within the Department of Defense. Most SARs are unclassified
and are publicly available. This allows wide dissemination of data
and results. This allows objective research outside the government
establishment to review the progress on the control of cost growth.
Failure to analyze classified systems should not significantly impact
the results of a cost growth study since there are a limited number of
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these systems. Furthermore, subsequent analyses by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense of all weapons systems when they become available,
including classified systems, will alleviate this concern.
Each cost variance must be reported on the SAR along with the
cause of the variance. This allows for a full accounting by the
services of these variances. A minimal amount of cross referencing will
be required by the services to obtain the root cause of the cost
variance which is needed to accurately analyze cost growth [Ref 4]
.
These advantages make the use of SAR data a necessity once it is
appropriately modified by the services into a more useful categorization
of the variances
.
2 . Disadvantages of SAR Data
Since the old SAR categories were not consistently applied,
obtaining the data in a consistent categorization will require the
cooperation of the services to reclassify the data into the new
categories . Each service will also need to reconstruct the actual cause
of each variance. Service cooperation is available, although it will
take two years to obtain all weapons systems covered by SAR reporting
requirements
.
The categorization of the cost variances is a judgment call.
The decisions by individual services may generate associated errors that
cannot be objectively described.
These disadvantages, while important, do not constitute a large
problem. The errors imparted into the data should not be of a
sufficiently large magnitude to nullify the findings. The additional
time to categorize the cost variances should be offset by the time saved
in using the SARs as described above.
D. MILESTONE II BASELINE
This baseline cost estimate is considered valid in the Department of
Defense since this is where the Developmental Estimate (DE) originates.
Prior to this point, numerous alternatives combined with unproven
12
concepts would tend to introduce gross margins of error into any
estimate
.
A major problem when analyzing weapons system cost growth is that
the DE baseline can change. The baseline is allowed to change if major
modifications or changes to the weapon system are performed. This could
suppress the actual cost growth of the system if the cost variances are
compared to the new baseline. The reconstruction of the data into the
new format by the services maintains the Milestone II baseline as its
initial estimate and reports all cost variances from this point. This
should allow for a focus on all forms of cost growth in the weapons
system.
E. ESCALATION ADJUSTMENT
The data used is in constant base year dollars. The base year for
analysis of cost growth of those systems that are beyond Milestone II is
generally chosen as the year the project enters EMD. Using constant
base year dollars is necessary when measuring program management effects
since this allows for consistent comparisons to the base estimate [Ref
5] . If then year (budgetary) dollars were used, any analysis that
combines the cost variances across time could not be performed since
this would result in attempting to combine different year dollars which
cannot be done. Therefore, for this analysis, constant base year
dollars are required.
F. QUANTITY ADJUSTMENT
Quantity changes, whether a change in the total quantity procured or
a change in the procurement rate, will greatly affect the total cost
growth of a system. Milestone II cost estimates were based on the
Milestone II quantity. Any subsequent change in quantity could not have
been foreseen at Milestone II. Therefore, an adjustment to the cost
variances needs to be made to account for these changes in quantity.
This is defined as quantity normalization.
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1. Quantity Related Cost Equation
Before developing the quantity normalization equation, it is
necessary to understand the composition of the current estimate (CE) and
how it relates to the Milestone II decision estimate (DE)
.
Two types of costs exist in the DE . One type is cost not
related to quantity. These are costs that do not change with changes in
the quantity to be procured or changes in the procurement rate.
Examples of these costs include initial design engineering and tooling.
The total nonquantity- related cost at the DE is defined as N.
The other type of cost in the DE is quantity related. The sum
of the quantity-related costs at Milestone II is defined as R. These
change with changes in quantity or changes in the procurement rate.
Examples of these costs include material and labor. The total quantity-
related cost at Milestone II is formed by the product of the Milestone
II unit cost (U) times the Milestone II quantity to be procured (Q) . By
evaluating the reasons given in the SAR for each of the cost variances,
any cost variance listed in the SAR can be classified as being either
quantity related or not. Therefore, the Milestone II DE is written as:
DE = N + R
= N + UQ
The total change in the nonquantity related costs from the
decision estimate to the current estimate (AN) can be calculated by
summing all of the cost variances that are not quantity related.
The total change in the quantity related costs from the decision
estimate to the current estimate (AR) can be calculated by summing all
of the cost variances that are quantity related.
The current estimate (CE) can be determined from the DE and the
cost variances by:
CE = DE + AN + AR
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A quantity related cost variance can be caused by a change in
the quantity to be procured (AQ) , a change in the unit cost of the item
(AU) , or both. Therefore, CE can be rewritten as:
CE = DE + AN + AR
= N + AN + R + AR
= N + AN + (U + AU) (Q + AQ)
= N + AN + UQ + QAU + UAQ + AUAQ
By further analyzing the reasons for the cost variances listed
in the SAR, those cost variances resulting from a change in quantity
with no change in unit cost can be identified. The sum of these cost
variances is defined as UAQ. The remaining quantity related cost
variances are due to changes in quantity with a corresponding change in
unit cost or are due to a change in unit cost with no change in the
quantity. The sum of these cost variances is defined as AU(Q + AQ)
.
Therefore, CE can be rewritten as:
CE = N + AN + UQ + QAU + UAQ + AUAQ
= (N + AN) + UQ + AU(Q + AQ) + UAQ
Define AP as the difference between the current estimate and the
decision estimate:
AP = CE - DE
= (N + AN) + UQ + AU(Q + AQ) + UAQ - (N + UQ)
= AN + AU(Q + AQ) + AUAQ
with AN, AU(Q + AQ) , and UAQ each being a determinable quantity.
2. Quantity Normalization Equation
The quantity normalization equation used in this research is
currently under development by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The preferred method of quantity normalization varies widely
[Refs. 4, 5] . Two types of effects due to quantity must be addressed.
The first is that the final quantity is changed with no change in the
procurement rate. This study deals with the total costs of the system
based on the quantity determined at Milestone II and therefore requires
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that this type of quantity change not result in a cost variance. The
second type of quantity effect is a change in the procurement rate with
no change in the final quantity. Since contractors face both fixed and
variable costs, a change in the procurement rate such as a schedule
slippage will result in a higher unit cost since additional fixed costs
will be incurred. This type of cost variance must be fully accounted
for.
The data collected is classified as to whether or not it was
quantity related. No adjustment for quantity is required if it is not
quantity related. The quantity adjustment to the cost variance must be
made to the base-year adjusted cost variance to remove any inflationary
effects
.
AP is not quantity normalized since a change in the quantity
(AQ) with no change in the procurement rate (i.e., AU = 0) will result
in a change in AP.
The required form for a quantity normalized procurement cost C
must remove any effect for a change in quantity without a change in
procurement rate since this form of cost variance could not have been
foreseen by the Milestone II estimators. However, C must fully account
for procurement rate changes since these are attributable to decisions
or mistakes that should have been foreseen at Milestone II. Therefore
the proper form for C is
:
C = (N + AN) + (U + AU)Q
This satisfies the requirements listed above, namely that
changes in quantity with no change in procurement cost are ignored but
that changes in procurement rate which affect the unit cost are
completely accounted for.
The quantity normalized cost variance AC is the quantity
normalized CE (C) minus the DE . This yields:
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AC = C - DE
= (N + AN) + (U + AU)Q - (N + UQ)
= AN + QAU
The equation for determining AC can be obtained as follows:
AC = AN + QAU
= AN + QAU(Q + AQ) / (Q + AQ)
The terms Q and AQ can be taken directly from the SAR. The
remaining terms, AN and AU(Q + AQ) can be determined by the method
listed previously when determining AP. Therefore, AC is the quantity
normalized procurement cost variance in base year dollars. AC will be
used in the analysis as the quantity normalized cost variance to
determine the cost growth of the weapon system.
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IV . DATA
Data from nine weapon systems are currently available. In several
years, data for all systems reported under the SAR guidelines will be
collected and all of the data will be analyzed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
Only nine systems were chosen due to the limited time available for
data collection for this study. The Department of Defense selected the
first nine systems so that they reflect a representative sample of the
systems in each service. They include ships, missiles and electronic
systems. No aircraft systems were available, and it should be noted
that the results of this analysis should not be applied to any analysis
of aircraft systems . There are approximately equal numbers of Army and
Navy systems. No Air Force systems were available.
The systems are at different times in their procurement lifetime and
have a wide range of total costs to reflect the actual nature of the
overall procurement process within the Department of Defense.
Four of the systems were reported by the Army. They were the ATACM
missile, the MLRS rocket system, the SINCGARS electronic system and the
MSE electronic system. The remaining five systems were reported by the
Navy. These are the CH\MH-53 helicopter, the Trident II submarine, the
DDG-51 surface ship, the HARM missile and the SM-2 missile.
The data for each weapon system was constructed from existing SAR
data by the respective service. The data consists of all cost variances
reported in constant base year dollars from the SAR since Milestone II
along with the SAR categorization, the new categorization, and whether
or not the cost variance is quantity related. The reported data also
included the Milestone II RDT&E and procurement costs as well as any
amplifying remarks necessary to further explain any cost variances.
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A. COST GROWTH RATIO
The cost growth ratio (CGR) is defined as the ratio of the quantity
and escalation adjusted cost variances and the Milestone II total system
costs including RDT&E costs:
CGR = AC/DE.
The total system cost is used so that the CGR represents the change
in the total cost of the system as opposed to a percentage change in the
procurement cost of the system. All cost variances for each system were
converted to CGRs . The CGR is used in nearly all research on cost
growth to show the magnitude of the change compared to the original
estimate. For instance, a fifty million dollar change in a system that
cost two hundred million dollars is much more significant than a fifty
million dollar change in a ten billion dollar system since the first
constitutes a relatively large change in the accuracy of the original
estimate (CGR = 0.25), while the latter is well within any reasonable
expectations for margin of estimating error (CGR = 0.005) .
For each system, the CGRs associated with a particular category,
using both the SAR and the new categorization systems, were aggregated
to form the cost growth for a system classified by category. The CGRs
that are associated with the mistake categories were aggregated to form
the mistake cost growth and in a similar manner the decision categories
were combined to form the decision cost growth.
The sum of the decision and mistake cost growths form the total cost
growth of a system since Milestone II.
B. DOLLAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE
When systems are combined into sets for analysis of the effects of
common factors, the dollar weighted average is used as the mean value
instead of the arithmetic mean. This is done to account for the greater
impact that cost growth of more expensive weapon systems has on
budgetary considerations. The objective of this research is to
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determine what factors are causing cost growth within the entire
Department of Defense rather than on a particular system. This type of
analysis should aid in determining the impact of cost growth on the
military's procurement budget. A strictly arithmetic average is not
appropriate in a budgetary context since the effect of less expensive
systems would skew the combined CGRs away from the expected cost growth
in the procurement of all weapons systems.
The weapon systems will be divided into various sets in the analysis
of their cost growth (e.g., Army and Navy systems) . The dollar weighted
average (DWA) for a set of weapon systems is determined by:
DWA = Z^w^CGRj i e {all systems in the set}
where w L = TC t / (EiTCJ Vi e {all systems in the set}
EiWi =1 i e {all systems in the set}
TCi = Milestone II total system cost of system i.
The TC^s for the weapon systems in the set must all be converted to the
same year dollars. For this analysis, all Milestone II estimates were
converted to 1993 constant dollars using the OSD/NAVCOMPT Guidance of
March 1993 dated 26 March 1993.
C. SINCGARS SYSTEM ANOMALY AND TREATMENT
The Army's SINCGARS electronic system has a CGR of
-0.777 for the seventh year since Milestone II. This results from a
decision in that year for a large scale reduction in the system. This
decision is not typical of most weapons systems. The data for the first
six years is typical and will be used. The first six years since
Milestone II had a total CGR of 0.105.
D. TOTAL DATA SET
Table 1 displays the Milestone II year, the Milestone II decision
estimate (DE) in millions of base year dollars, and the number of years
of data since Milestone II available. Each data series extends
only through the final year reported by each service.
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Table 2 displays the unweighted cost growth ratios for the decision
categories and the total decision cost growth ratio for each system. It
also displays the dollar weighted average of each category.
Table 3 displays the unweighted cost growth ratios for the mistake
categories and the total mistake cost growth ratio for each system. It
also displays the dollar weighted average of each category.
Table 4 displays the unweighted decision, mistake, and total cost
growth ratios for each system and the dollar weighted average of each
category.
TABLE 1. BASELINE SYSTEM DATA




ATACM 1990 1506.0 2
CH\MH-53 1979 510.0 12
DDG-51 1987 16723 .8 4




MSE 1989 3548.4 3
SINCGARS 1983 4145.0 6
SM-2 1984 6571.5 8
Trident 1986 14258.9 4
TABLE 2 UNWEIGHTED CGRS FOR DECISION CATEGORIES
Dcrv Dsmmi Dils Depf Descl Dother Decision
ATACM 0.023 0.015 0.038
CH\MH-53 -0.009 0.018 -0.310 -0.301
DDG-51 0.041 0.100 0.009 0.006 0.156
HARM -0.142 0.258 0.015 0.030 0.161
MLRS 0.079 0.014 0.035 -0.008 0.120
MSE 0.018 0.018
SINCGARS 0.156 -0.037 0.119
SM-2 0.016 0.072 0.010 -0.025 0.073
Trident -0.022 -0.022
Average 0.015 0.061 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.075
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TABLE 3 UNWEIGHTED CGRS FOR MISTAKE CATEGORIES
Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother Mistake
ATACM -0.011 . 020 0.C09
CH\MH-53 0.529 0.047 0.576
DDG-51 0.113 -0.005 .108
HARM 0.037 0.022 -0.005 0.002 0.056
MLRS -0.036 -0.006 -0.020 -0.062
MSE 0.082 -0.010 0.003 .075
SINCGARS -0.030 0.005 0.011 -0.014
SM-2 -0.033 -0.009 -0. 014 -0.056
Trident -0. 039 -0.001 . 014 .002 -0. 024
Average 0. 031 -0. 001 -0.001 0. 001 0.003 0.038
TABLE 4 . UNWEIGHTED SYSTEM COST GROWTH RATIOS
Decision Mistake Total
ATACM 0.038 0.009 . 047
CH\MH-53 -0.301 0.576 0.276
DDG-51 0.156 0.108 0.264
HARM 0.161 0.056 0.217
MLRS 0.120 -0.062 0.058
MSE 0.018 0.075 0.092
SINCGARS 0.119 -0.014 0.105
SM-2 0.073 -0.056 0.017
Trident -0.022 -0.024 -0.046
Average 0.075 0.033 0. 108
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V. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. USEFULNESS OF NEW CATEGORIES
In order to more readily identify areas of cost growth, it is
necessary to classify the cost variances into a more useable and more
detailed categorization system. The new system should classify the cost
growths into more categories than the SAR categorization method.
This system shows data counts, and it would be inappropriate to use
analysis of variance (ANOVA) since the data is not normally distributed.
However, a simple comparison of the number of categories needed under
each system will suffice in this determination.
Table 5 displays the number of SAR categories as compared to the
number of new categories used to classify each system' s cost variances
since Milestone II.
As can be seen from the table, all systems require a larger number
of categories to classify the cost variances using the new system than
using the SAR system. Therefore, those factors having the greatest
impact on cost growth can be more readily identified and the underlying
causes of each of the most significant contributors can be determined.













Trident II 2 5
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B. STATISTICAL APPROACH
1. Regression And Time Series Models
A regression model of the cost growth ratio would appear to be
useful when analyzing the cost growth of weapon systems. However, with
the limited data available, combined with the large variation in CGRs
,
the only regression model that fits is the full or saturated model which
does not provide any beneficial information. Also, since the objective
of this research is not to predict the cost growth of a specific system
but instead to describe the cost growth of the entire Department of
Defense, a regression model would not be of use.
A time series approach modeling the cost growth versus time of
weapon systems is also of little benefit. The uniqueness of an
individual weapon system and the decisions that affect a particular
system do not allow for general system models of cost growth for these
weapon systems.
2 . Data Groups
The weapon systems will be broken into sets to determine if a
specific attribute of each set of systems has an impact on the cost
growth of the set. The following groupings or sets of weapons systems
will be used to analyze the data: low cost versus high cost systems,
missile systems versus nonmissile systems, and Army versus Navy systems.
An analysis of those categories where a majority of the cost growth
occurs in each of these sets can be used to evaluate the causes of cost
growth. The reasons for each of the groupings will be discussed in
detail in each of the sections below.
3 . Testing For Common Means
The assumption of normality of the cost growth ratios in order
to test for common means using parametric tests would be difficult to
make since the CGR cannot go below a value of -1.0. The appropriate
nonparametric test for common means is the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test which
is equivalent to the Mann-Whitney U Test. The value of the Wilcoxon
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test statistic (W) will be given along with the associated level of
significance (p value)
.
If the p value associated with the Wilcoxon test is not
determinable as significant or not (i.e., between 0.1 and 0.15) and
paired system data is being evaluated, the Friedman nonparametric test
will be used to determine whether or not to accept the null hypothesis.
The Friedman chi-squared value (X 2 ) will be given along with the
associated level of significance (p value) when this test is conducted.
[Ref 6]
a. Dollar Weighting the Data
The mistake, decision, and total CGRs of each element i in a
set need to be transformed to account for the different total cost each
system has. This allows for a larger weight to be placed on the CGR of
the higher cost systems in the set and a lesser weight to be placed on
the less expensive systems in the set. Each CGR will be adjusted using
a dollar weighting factor. The dollar weighting factor (wj is
determined for each element i of a set of weapon systems and is
equivalent to the w t defined in calculating the dollar weighted average.
Before a test for common means is performed, the mistake, decision, and
total CGRs of each element i in the set is multiplied by its dollar
weighting factor Wi- The dollar weighted CGRs are then used for the
common means tests
.
C. DECISION VERSUS MISTAKE COST GROWTH
An analysis of the difference between decision cost growth and
mistake cost growth of all of the systems is required to determine how
accurate Milestone II estimates are and to identify those areas where
improvements in our estimating techniques need to be made.
1. Hypothesis
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is used to test the null hypothesis
that the mean cost growth due to decisions is equal to the mean cost
growth due to mistakes. The alternative hypothesis is that the mean
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cost growth for decisions is greater than the mean cost growth due to
mistakes . The common means test is performed on the dollar weighted
data for all nine weapon systems.
2 . Data
Table 6 displays the dollar weighted decision, mistake and total
cost growths for all the weapon systems.
TABLE 6. COST GROWTH RATIOS FOR EACH SYSTEM
System Decision Mistake Total
ATACM 0.001 0.000 . 001
CH\MH-53 -0.004 0.008 0.004
DDG-51 0.048 0.033 0.081
HARM 0.011 0.004 0.015
MLRS 0.005 -0. 003 0.002
MSE 0.001 0.004 0. 006
SINCGARS 0.010 -0.001 0.009
SM-2 0.010 -0.007 0.002
Trident II -0.006 -0.006 -0.012
3. Results of Decision Versus Mistake Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision and
mistake cost growth yields a test statistic value of W = 72 with a p
value of 0.13. This may or may not be significant, so a Friedman test
was performed and yields a test statistic value of X2 = 2.778 with a p
value of 0.096. This is significant and the null hypothesis of equal
means is rejected. Therefore, the mean decision cost growth is greater
than the mean mistake cost growth. The dollar weighted average (DWA)
decision cost growth is 0.075 and the DWA mistake cost growth is 0.033.
4 . Categorical Analysis
Table 7 displays the dollar weighted average CGRs of the
decision and mistake categories. No statistical tests were performed to
determine which categories contain the largest cost growth; only a
visual inspection is required.
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TABLE 7 . AVERAGE CATEGORY CGRS FOR ALL SYSTEMS
Decision Dcrv Dsmmi Dils Depf Descl Dother
CGR 0.015 0.061 -0. 001 -0.001 0.002
Mistake Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother
CGR . 031 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003
The majority of decision cost growth occurs in the Dsmmi
category and has a dollar weighted average value of 0.061. The majority
of mistake cost growth occurs in the Mcep category and has a dollar
weighted average value of 0.031.
D. LOW COST VERSUS HIGH COST SYSTEMS
A determination of the relationship between system cost and system
cost growth is needed to determine if a difference exists between the
cost growth of low cost systems and the cost growth of high cost
systems. A low cost system is defined as any system whose total system
cost estimated at Milestone II is less than three and a half billion
dollars. The value of three and a half billion dollars is somewhat
arbitrary, but this number was chosen to split the number of systems in
each grouping approximately in half and to ensure that an approximately
equal ratio of Army to Navy systems exist in each set to eliminate any
possible service effects. The low cost systems are the ATACM, the
CH\MH-53, the HARM and the MLRS . The systems in the high cost category
are the DDG-51, the MSE, the SINCGARS, the SM-2 and the Trident II.
1. Hypothesis
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is used to test the null hypothesis
that the mean cost growth of low cost systems is equal to the mean cost
growth of high cost systems. The alternative hypothesis is that the low
cost systems have a higher mean cost growth than the high cost systems
.
2. Data
Table 8 displays the dollar weighted cost growth ratios for the
low cost weapon systems.
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Table 9 displays the dollar weighted cost growth ratios for the
high cost weapon systems
.
TABLE 8. DOLLAR WEIGHTED CGRS FOR LOW COST SYSTEMS
System Decision MistaKe Total
ATACM 0.006 0.001 0.008
CH\MH-53 -0.029 0.055 0.026
HARM 0.075 0.026 0.102
MLRS 0.033 -0. 017 . 016
TABLE 9 DOLLAR WEIGHTED CGRS FOR HIGH COST SYSTEMS
System Decision Mistake Total
DDG-51 0. 056 0.039 0.095
MSE 0.001 0.005 0.007
SINCGARS 0.012 -0.001 0.011
SM-2 0.011 -0.009 0.003
Trident II -0.007 -0. 008 -0.014
3 . Comparison between High Cost and Low Cost Systems
a. Total Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for total cost
growth of low cost and high cost systems yields a test statistic value
of W = 19 with a p value of 0.08. This is significant and the null
hypothesis of equal means is rejected. Therefore, the mean total cost
growth of low cost systems is greater than the mean total cost growth of
high cost systems . The DWA total cost growth for low cost systems is
0.152 and the DWA total cost growth for high cost systems is 0.100.
b. Decision Cost Growth Comparison
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth of low cost and high cost systems yields a test statistic
value of W = 22 with a p value of 0.311. This is not significant and
the null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
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c. Mistake Cost Growth Comparison
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for mistake cost
growth of low cost and high cost systems yields a test statistic value
of W = 21 with a p value of 0.35. This is not significant and the null
hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
The difference between the mistake cost growths, while not
statistically different, is substantively different. The total cost
growth of low cost systems is greater than that of high cost systems,
and it can be observed that the difference between the mistake cost
growths is the driving factor behind this difference. The DWA mistake
cost growth for low cost systems is 0.066, while the DWA total cost
growth for high cost systems is 0.027.
4. Low Cost Systems
a. Decision Versus Mistake Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth and mistake cost growth of low cost systems yields a test
statistic value of W = 17 with a p value of 0.38. This is not
significant and the null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
b. Categorical Analysis
Table 10 displays the dollar weighted average CGRs of the
decision and mistake categories for low cost systems. No statistical
tests were performed to determine which categories contain the largest
cost growth; only a visual inspection is required.
TABLE 10. AVERAGE CATEGORY CGRS FOR LOW COST SYSTEMS
Decision Dcrv Dsmmi Dils Depf Descl Dother
CGR -0.046 0.130 -0.013 0. 014
Mistake Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother
CGR 0.058 0.011 -0.002 0.004 -0.005
The majority of decision cost growth for low cost systems
occurs in the Dsmmi category and has a dollar weighted average value of
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0.13 0. The majority of mistake cost growth in low cost systems occurs
in the Mcep category and has a dollar weighted average value of 0.058.
5. High Cost Systems
a. Decision Versus Mistake Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth and mistake cost growth of high cost systems yields a test
statistic value of W = 22 with a p value of 0.14. This may or may not
be significant, so a Friedman test was performed and yields a test
statistic value of X2 = 1.8 with a p value of 0.18. This is not
significant and the null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
The difference between the mistake and decision cost
growths, while not statistically different, is substantively different
when compared to the difference between the decision and mistake cost
growths of low cost systems. The DWA mistake cost growth for high cost
systems 0.027 and the DWA decision cost growth for high cost systems is
0.074.
b. Categorical Analysis
Table 11 displays the dollar weighted average CGRs of the
decision and mistake categories for high cost systems. No statistical
tests were performed to determine which categories contain the largest
cost growth; only a visual inspection is required.
TABLE 11. AVERAGE CATEGORY CGRS FOR HIGH COST SYSTEMS
Decision Dcrv Dsmmi Dils Depf Descl Dother
CGR 0.026 0.048 0.001 -0.004 0.002
Mistake Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother
CGR 0.026 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
The majority of decision cost growth for high cost systems
occurs in the Dsmmi category and has a dollar weighted average value of
0.048. The majority of mistake cost growth for high cost systems occurs
in the Mcep category and has a dollar weighted average value of 0.026.
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E. MISSILE SYSTEMS VERSUS OTHER SYSTEMS
An analysis of the cost growth of missile systems compared to other
weapons systems is beneficial since it will allow for identification of
differences in the procurement and estimation processes of these systems
that may need to be evaluated in further detail in future studies . The
missile systems consist of the ATACM, the HARM and the SM-2. These two
sets have approximately equal low cost to high cost ratios and Army to
Navy system ratios. This should remove any effects that system cost




The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is performed to test the null
hypothesis that the mean cost growth of missile systems is equal to the
mean cost growth of other weapon systems. The alternative hypothesis is




Table 12 displays the dollar weighted cost growths for missile
systems
.
Table 13 displays the dollar weighted cost growths for the
nonmissile systems.
TABLE 12 . DOLLAR WEIGHTED CGRS FOR MISSILE SYSTEMS
System Decision Mistake Total
ATACM 0.004 0.001 0.005
HARM 0.050 0.018 0.068
SM-2 0.042 -0.032 0.010
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TABLE 13 DOLLAR WEIGHTED CGRS FOR NONMISSILE SYSTEMS
System Decision Mistake Total
CH\MH-53 -0.006 0.011 0.005
DDG-51 0.062 0.043 0. 104
MSE 0.006 -0.003 0.003
SINCGARS 0.001 0.006 0.007
SM-2 0.013 -0.002 0. 012
Trident II -0.008 -0.008 -0.016
3. Comparison between Missile and Nonmissile Systems
a. Total Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for total cost
growth of missile and nonmissile systems yields a test statistic value
of W = 17.5 with a p value of 0.27. This is not significant and the
null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
b. Decision Cost Growth Comparison
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth of missile and nonmissile systems yields a test statistic
value of W = 19 with a p value of 0.16. This is not significant and the
null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
c. Mistake Cost Growth Comparison
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for mistake cost
growth of missile and nonmissile systems yields a test statistic value
of W = 14 with a p value of 0.40. This is not significant and the null
hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
The difference between the mistake cost growths for missile
and nonmissile systems, while not statistically different, is
substantively different. It can be readily observed that the difference
between the mistake cost growths is relevant when compared to the
decision cost growths as is discussed below. The DWA mistake cost
growth for missile systems is -0.014 and the DWA total cost growth for
nonmissile systems is 0.046.
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4 . Missile Systems
a. Decision Versus Mistake Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth and mistake cost growth of missile systems yields a test
statistic value of W = 7 with a p value of 0.076. This is significant
and the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected. The DWA mistake
cost growth for missile systems -0.014 and the DWA decision cost growth
for missile systems is 0.097.
b. Categorical Analysis
Table 14 displays the dollar weighted average CGRs of the
decision and mistake categories for missile systems. No statistical
tests were performed to determine which categories contain the largest
cost growth; only a visual inspection is required.
TABLE 14 . AVERAGE CATEGORY CGRS FOR MISSILE SYSTEMS
Decision Dcrv Dsmmi Oils Depf Descl Dother
CGR -0.035 0.125 0.010 -0.003
Mistake Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother
CGR -0.007 0.001 -0.002 -0.005
The majority of decision cost growth for missile systems
occurs in the Dsmmi category and has a dollar weighted average value of
0.125. The majority of mistake cost growth for missile systems occurs
in the Mcep category and has a dollar weighted average value of -0.007.
5. Nonmissile Systems
a. Decision Versus Mistake Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth and mistake cost growth of nonmissile systems yields a test
statistic value of W = 38 with a p value of 0.43. This is not
significant and the null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
b. Categorical Analysis
Table 15 displays the dollar weighted average CGRs of the
decision and mistake categories for nonmissile systems. No statistical
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tests were performed to determine which categories contain the largest
cost growth; only a visual inspection is required.
TABLE 15. AVERAGE CATEGORY CGRS FOR NONMISSILE SYSTEMS
Decision Dcrv Dsmmi Dils Depf Descl Dother
CGR 0.030 0. 042 -0.005 0.002
Mistake Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother
CGR 0.042 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.005
The majority of decision cost growth for nonmissile systems
occurs in two categories, the Dsmmi category and the Dcrv category. The
Dsmmi category has a dollar weighted average value of 0.042. The Dcrv
category has a dollar weighted average value of 0.030. The majority of
mistake cost growth for non missile systems occurs in the Mcep category
and has a dollar weighted average value of . 042
.
F. ARMY VERSUS NAVY SYSTEMS
A comparison of Navy cost growth versus Army cost growth is required
to determine which service, if either, has a better estimation or
decision making process.
1. Hypothesis
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is performed to test the null
hypothesis that the mean cost growth of Army systems is equal to the
mean cost growth of Navy systems. The alternative hypothesis is that
the means are not equal
.
2. Data
Table 16 displays the dollar weighted cost growths for Army
systems along with the dollar weighted average (DWA) of these systems.
Table 17 displays the dollar weighted cost growths for the Navy
systems along with the dollar weighted average (DWA) of these systems.
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TABLE 16. DOLLAR WEIGHTED CGRS FOR ARMY SYSTEMS
System Decision Mistake Total
ATACM 0. 004 0.001 0.005
MLRS 0.023 -0. 012 0.011
MSE 0.005 0.021 0.026
SINCGARS 0.048 -0.006 0.043
TABLE 17 . DOLLAR WEIGHTED CGRS FOR NAVY SYSTEMS
System Decision Mistake Total
CH\MH-5 3 -0 .006 .011 0.005
DDG-51 0. 060 0.042 . 102
HARM 0. 014 0. 005 0.020
SM-2 0. 012 -0.009 0.003
Trident II -0. 007 -0.008 -0 . 016
3. Comparison between Army and Navy Systems
a. Total Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for total cost
growth of Army and Navy systems yields a test statistic value of W =
21.5 with a p value of 0.21. This is not significant and the null
hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
b. Decision Cost Growth Comparison
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth of Army and Navy systems yields a test statistic value of W
= 22 with a p value of 0.31. This is not significant and the null
hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
c. Mistake Cost Growth Comparison
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for mistake cost
growth of Army and Navy systems yields a test statistic value of W = 18
with a p value of 0.31. This is not significant and the null hypothesis
of equal means is not rejected.
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4. Army Systems
a. Decision Versus Mistake Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth and mistake cost growth of Army systems yields a test
statistic value of W = 12 with a p value of 0.045. This is significant
and the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected. The DWA mistake
cost growth for Army systems 0.004 and the DWA decision cost growth for
Army systems is 0.081.
jb. Categorical Analysis
Table 18 displays the dollar weighted average CGRs of the
decision and mistake categories for Army systems. No statistical tests
were performed to determine which categories contain the largest cost
growth; only a visual inspection is required.
TABLE 18. AVERAGE CATEGORY CGRS FOR ARMY SYSTEMS
Decision Dcrv Dsmmi Dils Depf Descl Dother
CGR 0.079 0.011 -0.008
Mistake Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother
CGR 0.004 -0.003 0.005 0.002 -0.004
The majority of decision cost growth in Army systems occurs
in the Dcrv category and has a dollar weighted average value of 0.079.
The majority of mistake cost growth in Army systems occurs in two
categories, the Mcep category and the Mssmf category. The Mcep category
has a dollar weighted average value of 0.004. The Mssmf category has a
dollar weighted average value of 0.005.
5. Navy Systems
a. Decision Versus Mistake Cost Growth
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for common means for decision
cost growth and mistake cost growth of Navy systems yields a test
statistic value of W = 23 with a p value of 0.18. This is not
significant and the null hypothesis of equal means is not rejected.
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b. Categorical Analysis
Table 19 displays the dollar weighted average CGRs of the
decision and mistake categories for Navy systems. No statistical tests
were performed to determine which categories contain the largest cost
growth; only a visual inspection is required.
TABLE 19. AVERAGE CATEGORY CGRS FOR NAVY SYSTEMS
Decision Dcrv Dsmmi Dils Depf Descl Dother
CGR -0. 002 0.074 . 001 -0.001 0.002
Mistake Mcep Mcede Mils Mssmf Mescl Mother
CGR 0.038 -0.001 0.003 0. 001
The majority of decision cost growth in Navy systems occurs
in the Dsmmi category and has a dollar weighted average value of 0.074.
The majority of mistake cost growth in Navy systems occurs in the Mcep




The new categorization systems breaks out the cost growth into more
categories than the SAR system. This system is better at detecting
sources of cost growth in a particular weapon system and enabling
correction of that source. It also shows when mistakes or decisions are
the major effect behind the cost growth of a system.
B. DOLLAR WEIGHTED AVERAGES
Using dollar weighted averages adjusts the findings to account for
the greater effect more expensive weapon systems have on budgetary
considerations. This allows for a more realistic interpretation of the
cost growth and its effect on the defense budget. If an arithmetic
average is used, the data is equally weighted, giving the cost growth of
low cost systems an equal weight on the overall cost growth. This would
tend to skew the results and not allow them to be applied directly to
the entire military budget.
An example of this effect occurs when evaluating the decision and
mistake cost growth ratios of all the weapon systems. If an arithmetic
average is used, the average decision cost growth ratio is 0.040 and the
average mistake cost growth ratio is 0.074. This is opposite to the
findings using dollar weighted averages, where the decision cost growth
ratio is 0.075 and the mistake cost growth ratio is 0.033. By using an
arithmetic mean, it would lead one to conclude that 7.4% mistake cost
growth is occurring in the defense budget, when in reality, only 3.3% is
occurring. Therefore, dollar weighted averages provide a more realistic
picture of cost growth.
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C. SYSTEM COST GROWTH
1. Total Cost Growth
The total cost growth of a weapon system is much less than might
be expected. It has a dollar weighted average value of 0.108.
A 1980 study reports that the average total cost growth of
weapons systems is 25.9% [Ref . 3] . This is significantly higher than
the 10.8% this analysis shows. However, the time of that study is
relevant to the difference in findings. The development by estimators
of a computerized large data base, which contains the production costs
of a large number of components, assemblies, and subassemblies, allows
for a more accurate estimate of the production costs of new systems.
This is beneficial in estimating system costs which should bring cost
growth down. Another cause is the high technologies that were brand new
in 1980 and extremely difficult to estimate have been developed and
produced so that now they are much easier to estimate. Lastly, the
results of the 1980 study and others resulted in a determined effort by
the Department of Defense to control cost growth. This has also had a
positive impact in lowering the cost growth of weapons systems.
2. System Model
Eighty five percent of the total cost growth can be captured in
Dsmmi and the Mcep categories. To control total cost growth, it is
required that the cost growth in these two categories be focused upon.
The possible causes of the cost growth in these categories will be
discussed below.
3. Mistake and Decision Cost Growth Comparison
Mistakes make up 30.6% of the total cost growth of a system
while decisions make up 6 9.4% of the total cost growth. Therefore
decisions outweigh mistakes by a margin of 2.3:1.
One recent study reports that cost growth due to decisions
outweighs cost growth due to mistakes by a margin of two to one [Ref.
7] . This analysis reaches a similar conclusion.
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4. Mistake Cost Growth
A majority of the mistake cost growth occurs in the Mcep
category. The Mcep category is used to classify cost variances
attributable to mistakes in estimating the cost of production. While it
may be noted that this implies that the Department of Defense needs to
concentrate its efforts on becoming better at estimating the production
costs of a weapon system, the mistake cost growth for a system is only
3.3% and is not nearly as significant as controlling the cost growth due
to decisions.
5 . Decision Cost Growth
A majority of the decision cost growth occurs in the Dsmmi
category. The Dsmmi category is used to classify cost variances
attributable to a decision to change the procurement schedule, shifts in
the multiyear procurement rate or in different management initiatives.
A detailed analysis of the data indicates that a majority of the Dsmmi
cost growth is due to schedule slippage. Some of this schedule slippage
can be attributed to decisions to change the design and performance
requirements of the system. These changes are classified into the Dcrv
category and has a dollar weighted value of 0.015. This may or may not
account for all of the schedule slippage, however, the data does not
provide sufficient evidence to support or deny this possible
explanation. Further study concentrating on the causes of schedule
slippage needs to be done.
D. SYSTEM COST COMPARISON
The driving factor between the difference between low cost system
cost growth and high cost system cost growth is the difference in the
mistake cost growth.
The low cost systems have a higher mistake cost growth by a margin
of 2.4:1. Both high and low cost systems have a majority of their
mistake cost growth occurring in the Mcep category. This is not
surprising since this result has already been determined above.
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However, low cost systems have over twice as much cost growth in the
Mcep category than do high cost systems. This indicates that estimators
are not nearly as adept at estimating the production costs of low cost
systems as high cost systems.
One possible explanation for this is that estimators do not take as
much care in estimating the costs of low cost systems . Low cost systems
are not nearly as visible on a Congressional oversight level or on an
internal level, and therefore the care taken to accurately estimate the
production cost of a system may not be nearly as high as for that of the
more expensive systems.
Another explanation concerns the nature of high cost to low cost
systems [Ref . 1] . A majority of high cost systems are large platforms
which have a majority of their production cost resulting from large
components. These large components, such as hull construction or
propulsion plants, have been used before or a similar component has been
used before. This makes the estimation of the production costs of these
large components fairly accurate. The mistakes in estimating the
smaller and relatively cheaper items would be masked in the overall cost
growth of the system even if they were of equal dollar value to the
errors in the low cost systems.
Therefore, the difference between the low cost and high cost system
mistake cost growth is probably not as significant as it appears to be.
E. MISSILE SYSTEMS
The significant difference between the cost growth of missile
systems as compared to other weapon systems is that the mistake cost
growth for missile systems is significantly less than that of other
systems, specifically in estimating the cost of production. The most
likely explanation is similar to the discussion above concerning the
cost of a system. Missiles are evolutionary in nature. The guidance
system of newer missiles is generally a modernization or modification of
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a previous guidance system. The same can be said for propulsion system
and warhead type. This would tend to increase the accuracy of missile
systems over other types of systems.
One report on cost growth states that missile systems have a much
higher cost growth than do other systems [Ref . 1] . This article,
prepared in 1982, included much older missile systems. The evolutionary
process discussed above had not yet developed and therefore a higher
cost growth could have resulted. A comparison of the cost growth of
older missile systems to newer ones would be required to validate this
assertion.
F. SERVICE COMPARISON
The Army and Navy have effectively equivalent cost growths. The
only difference is that part of the Army's mistake cost growth results
from mistakes in the estimation process that resulted in schedule slips.
The reasons behind this are not clear and need to be addressed in the
future
.
A majority of early 1980s studies reported that the Army had a
significantly higher cost growth than the Navy [Refs. 1, 3] . This was
attributed to the modernization of the Army. This study concentrated on
more recent weapons systems and did not find this to be the case. The
most obvious explanation for this effect is that the Army has completed






The new categorization system should be used to classify cost
variances in the SAR system. This would allow for a more detailed
accounting of the cost variances and allow for identification of the
exact areas in which cost growth is occurring.
B. TOTAL COST GROWTH
The total cost growth as been significantly lowered over the past
ten years. This is significant and promising. The Department of
Defense should continue its current oversight and decision process to
ensure that future cost growth is maintained at acceptable levels.
C. DECISION COST GROWTH
Decision cost growth is the driving force behind the total cost
growth of weapon systems. This is driven by decisions that result in
schedule slippage in the procurement process. This type of cost growth
must be minimized. The most likely solution is to ensure at Milestone
II that all decisions that can be made that could result in schedule
slippage are made and finalized.
D. MISTAKE COST GROWTH
The mistake cost growth is well within any reasonable limits. The
driving factor for this type of growth is mistakes in estimating the
production costs of a weapon system. This amounts to only 3.3% cost
growth and is well within any reasonable margin of error that could be
placed on this type of estimation.
E. ARMY COST GROWTH
The Army mistake cost growth, while similar in magnitude to the
Navy's, is partially driven by schedule slippage. The Army must
43
evaluate the factors that are causing this problem and correct them.
One possible solution is to compare the Army' s estimation process with
the Navy's and to attempt to isolate the key differences that result in
this type of cost growth.
F. FUTURE STUDIES
All of the results and conclusions of this study are tentative since
they are based on nine weapon systems. This is the initial analysis of
a three year study by the DoD and the results and conclusions of the
study using all of the SAR reportable weapon systems may differ from
this report.
A continuation of this study, once data for more weapons systems has
been obtained, should be done to compare Air Force systems with those of
the Army and Navy. Also, a comparison of aircraft and ship cost growth
would be beneficial.
A study of RDT&E cost growth is necessary to evaluate the decision
and estimation process of this aspect of weapon system acquisition.
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